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Young Children's Discourse 
and the Origins of the World: 
A Reading of Essences 
by 
David Kennedy 
The Transformation into Text 
But when you get these pictures from outer space [he holds them up) you 
suddenly notice that the earth seems to be alive . I mean, I'm not sure 
what I mean by "alive" . 
The earth is alive. 
Well, look at it--if you look at this picture, and if you look at that 
picture up there, you definitely get the sense that there's something 
sort of ... 
Living. Alive. Moving. 
... together about it, isn't there? And so--
And it's floating up in space ... and going down all the way through 
space with ... with kinda rocket shoes ... or that's also invisible 
... or that also's a head with two eyes and a smile. 
Well, what I wanted to ask you about was where ... what about the 
origins of this thing that we live on--where does it come from? 
I've got a question. 
We're alive. Is it alive? And if it's not alive, how does it bring 
forth the life that we are? 
I have a question. 
O.K. Does it have to do with what we're talking about? 
Yes it does. 
He's a hairy monster. 
Well, the earth is a round ball, and, and it always goes round and 
round the sun ... and if it got closer it would be a different color, 
like it would turn green or something. 
Closer to what? 
Or yellow or red? 
The sun. 
So you're saying that its color and everything depend on its distance 
from the sun . That's a very good point. 
Yah, and if it got so, so very close, very close that it could turn up 
into ashes, um ... I would think it would turn orange, I guess. 
Well then you're saying that it comes from the sun? ••. Or ... 
you're not saying that. 
I'm not saying that. 



































No it doesn't come from burning gas! Neither does the earth! 
Well let's let him say it, and then you can respond to it. 
The sun is burning gas. But ... 
Oh. The sun is burning gas. 
But how, how does the ... the • um, gas get on the sun? 
How did the gas get on the sun? 
I can tell you. 
I thought you said the sun was--is burning gas? 
Cause the gas tank can't get blowed up in space or spray it on it. 
[laughs] No! 
Um, I've got a question. . I've got another one to answer his. 
O.K. Let's not ... Let's let everybody get a chance to talk who 
wants to, though, Sara. 
I think uh ... I think uh . the uh ... burning gas is in space 
.•. and I think that's why [over-ruling denial] . and I think 
that's why we have space shuttles so they won't get gas in their. 
[inaudible]. 
[almost whispering] There's no burning gas up in space! The stars are 
gas. 
The stars are what? 
And they're burning real real hot. 
The stars are burning? That's why they're bright? 
Um, yah. Um, you know what? If they went outside in space, uh .. . 
they would burn up. 
Uh uh! 
But some astronauts got out of their space shuttle and didn't burn up. 
Of course they had those • incredible suits on. 
Yah, those metal suits. 
[competition from three or four for the floor] 
David! I have a real important question. 
[Alan still talking about metal] 
O.K. Let's wait and make sure we have order •.. Since it's so 
important. 
Order in the court. 
Yes, that's right. 
then Sara give her 
Order in the court. O.K. 
really important question. 
Let's let Penny talk and 
Nine five and six year olds are sitting in a circle on a thick rug at a 
kindergarten daycare center in a small college town in Kentucky. They are talk-
ing about the earth and space. They have been led into the subject by their 
teacher, who is acting as a moderator, attempting--at least at the most osten-
sible level--to enforce the fundamental rules of an egalitarian model of 
discourse. 
The tape recorder is running. The teacher is working at very close 
quarters--restating, extending, repairing broken connections in the conversation, 
which is proceeding with the passionate, tumultuous intensity typical of this 
small group of young children. Already, in the first few minutes, the conversa-
tion has heated up to a near-chaos of sudden insights and bold theoretical 
sweeps flung partially and inarticulately forth, dramatic changes of subject, 
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interruptions, arguments, bids for authority, expressions of biting rivalry, 
raucous word and idea play; and, lurking under it, always--for the teacher at 
least--the spectre of its dissolution in a welter of hilarity, acrimony, or some 
combination of the two. 
The tape recorder was, in the heat of this event, the only representative 
of its future transformation into text. Now here, later, after painstaking 
transcription, the text has completely replaced the event. The transformation 
into text has not abstracted the event: Sara's searing energy is still present 
to me--in fact, more quintessentially so--and Nathan's driving, inquisitive 
style still shines through to any reader who allows the text to work in him or 
her. The text has not so much abstracted as universalized the event. Its form 
of displacement reveals the universal in the concrete, but not apart from the 
concrete. The text in its thusness, its thrown givenness, maintains that 
paradoxical nature of the hermeneutical circle, its tension of the circumscribed 
and the limitless, which never allows more than its facticity and contingency 
warrant, and yet always demands recognition of the universal meanings hidden in 
its concreteness. Merleau-Ponty expressed this with typical elliptical clarity: 
"We must ... become aware of this paradox--that we never free ourselves from 
the particular except by taking over a situation that is all at once, and 
inseparably, both limitation and access to the universal" (1964, p. 82). The 
text reveals how every lived event is an evocation of totality in the playing 
out of the multiple, the emergence of "a spontaneous order, a meaning, an intrin-
sic truth" (Merleau-Ponty, 1964, p. 52) at the very heart of the contingent. 
For the teacher of the young child, who so often struggles for order among 
persons who at times seem to exemplify the extreme and unreflective drivenness 
of fear and desire, the text is revelatory almost to the point of magic. What 
struggling teacher can see, except in incoherent glimpses or rare, special 
moments, the deep reason operating in this event, except in its transformation 
into text? 
Lineaments of the Text: Discourse, Narrative, and Essence 
I want to distinguish roughly between three kinds of young children's dis-
course in educational settings. On one end of a continuum there is school 
discourse in its classical form. Its major characteristic is an order imposed 
by a central adult authority, around whose cues topic initiation and maintenance, 
turn-taking conventions, speaker-listener interchanges, and conversational repair 
are practiced and internalized. This sort of discourse, as quasi-formal and 
unique as it is, can be studied linguistically: that is, the larger exchange 
patterns of the ordered classroom can be interpreted as events with the same 
sort of structural characteristics as phonemes, words, phrases, and sentences 
(Willes, 1983; Ripich & Spinelli, 1985). 
On the other end of the continuum is the discourse of children left to 
themselves--the language of dramatic play, of the playground, of groups sitting 
around without a teacher--or we may even say, groups "out of control" in a 
classroom setting. This is a discourse much more difficult to capture in its 
structural patterns, given its wildly playful modalities. It is the sort of 
language event whose inner logic tends to be hidden in apparent randomness or 
chaos, rather than self-consciously imposed, as in teacher-led discourse. 
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The text here under interrogation is an example of a third . sort, and it falls 
somewhere between these poles. It is not didactic discourse or spontaneous 
(un-adult-erated) discourse, but what may in a loose sense be called philosophi-
cal discourse. It lacks the most obvious elements of didactic discourse, which 
is the "cue-bid-nomination" move, that is, the call for an answer to a question, 
a raised hand, and the bestowal on the one cued of the right to speak (Willes, 
1983, pp. 70-72, 100). In this case I did not insist on bids, but acted as 
arbiter of turn disputes, maintainer of topic across turns, and initiator of 
conversational repairs when necessary--i.e., as moderator. This is not to say 
that strong elements of both didactic and spontaneous discourse did not assert 
themselves periodically; in fact those moments when they did are very much part 
of the overall texture of the discourse-event. 
This particular approach seems to lead to a form of discourse which displays 
a high and tumultuous tension. It is arguable that didactic discourse is simply 
an artifact of this same tension in a state of formal suppression, and that 
spontaneous child discourse displays this tension-ridden structure most manifest-
ly. The sources of tension are, significantly enough, the same ones that very 
often make philosophical discourse a difficult form for adults. For one, the 
children's thinking moves much faster than the discourse rules usually allow, 
making connections and associations, finding relations, and negating or affirming 
a previous point. Second, the elements of simultaneity, playfulness, and emer-
·gence which, I will argue below, are essential to the event, tend to contravene 
ordered discourse. Then there is the young child's unfamiliarity with the "rules 
of the game," combined with chronically low impulse control, and the ineradicable 
element of competition for scarce resources (the resources here being the atten-
tion of the whole group), with which are associated--in what causal constella-
tion is not entirely clear--ideological conflicts and struggles between 
individuals and even subgroups. These, too, are typical elements of adult 
discourse of this sort, although among adults they are sublimated, concealed, 
denied, or expressed with more sophistication. 
In order to question the text further, it is necessary to pass beyond the 
comfortably reduced level of discourse analysis--that micro-world where language 
forms are deliberately "stopped," or made opaque. What--beneath, among, between, 
included in the tumultuous order of the discourse patterns--what larger patterns 
reveal themselves? Clearly, a story is telling itself. Actually it is a story 
about a story, a meta-narrative. It is the story of an argument about world 
view, and about knowledge--about how one can know the "true" story, and in what 
sort of informational form it consists. This is what makes it philosophical. 
Narrative can be, and has been, starting at least with Propp (1968), 
included in the linguistic methodological continuum upon which we have already 
placed discourse. "Language," as Willes says, "is a patterned activity at every 
level of its organization" (1983, p. 88), and this ranges from phoneme to narra-
tive form. As such, the text is clearly available to a structuralist interpre-
tation. We find . it, in fact, "telling" not only its own story, but the role and 
function of its participants. As Joana said in a follow-up session (if with a 
different trope), "We're a story. He's [God is] telling the story." 
But one can go even deeper into the text. There are modal patterns operat-
ing even beyond narrative. These patterns are also language, but they are 
unspeakable--at least from a diacritical, structuralist point of view. 
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At these deeper levels the text can be read off, or "played," in more than 
one way, for the text in its textuality is a cosmos, a self-contained field of 
relations which can be taken as a whole in this way or that. But in holding 
oneself open to what reveals itself in the interconnected field of the text, 
there is for each interpreter that which, as Heidegger described it, "is not to 
be gotten around," i.e., "that which in the fullness of its coming to presence 
they [the sciences] can never encompass by means of their representing" (1977b, 
pp. 174, 175-176). "That which cannot be gotten around" means: that which can-
not be absorbed into our systematic interpretive structures; cannot be "enframed" 
(p. 19) in regions delineated in advance, since i t is a dimension of the ground 
of those regions. It can only be described as a phenomenon, after (or inextric-
ably bound up with) the fact, rather than explained. It can only be "beheld"--
theorein (pp. 163-165)--with the passionate, contemplative interest of the 
philosopher, rather than the predicting, controlling interest of the social 
scientist/educator. 
Essence is ·~ot simply ... what something is, but ... further, the way 
in which something pursues its course, the way in which it remains in time as 
what it is" (Heidegger, 1977b, p. 3). Essences are irreducible features of 
meaning which are inexhaustibly present in lived experience. They leave their 
traces in the text like photographic patterns of shadow and light. They are 
ciphers of what Heidegger called "world" (1962, pp. 102-107). World is always 
already there, and is therefore unavailable to any ultimately reflective act. 
In fact, world's essentiality enters reflection, as a rule, only with a "reversal 
of consciousness," only when something goes wrong, when the tool breaks (Heideg-
ger, 1964, p. 105), with "continually false generalizations being refuted by 
experience, and what was regarded as typical being shown not to be so" (Gadamer, 
1975, p. 316). 
In this case, the text itself is the moment of negativity which opens our 
insight into world, even as it fragments and obscures its original lived quality 
by reconstructing it in another dimension. Here, the text is the break in the 
uncapturable everydayness of things. The essences are only glimpsed within it: 
it only carries their traces. They are not, after all, entities, but forms of 
relation in time. "The essence of an experience is always a certain modality of 
our relation to the world" (Merleau-Ponty, 1964, p. 62). 
Further, "reading" these essences is a form of relation as well--a kind of 
relation with the text called "interpretation." And not only that, but in this 
particular case the interpreter finds himself in the text ("D.K.") in a central 
and unescapable way. Here, each act of reflection on the text is an act of 
reflection on self as well: on one's irremediable influence, for good or for 
ill, in the field of the text, on one's own perilously fallible practice, and on 
the crucial tension between social role (teacher) and individual identity (me)--
i.e., fate and freedom--that the text throws into dramatic relief for each 
participant, oneself included. 
Finally, the essences which become available--whose traces surface like 
fragments of a secret code--do not directly inform practice in the sense of 
providing me with a new technique with which to return to other such discus-
sions. Rather, seeing the essences contributes to the deconstruction of the 
very notion of a technical approach. I return from the text to lived experience 
with a greater capacity to wait, to listen, to position myself for the emergence 
of the essential significance of all experience. I return more convinced than 
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ever of the reason hidden in everything, which reveals itself when I allow 
myself "to be conducted by the object" (Gadamer, 1975, p. 330). When this 
dialectic has its way, one can only act maieutically, like a midwife, which is 
a sort of active non-action, a determination to be present to something which is 
unfolding into presence from somewhere beyond any one participant, in the pres-
encing which is the event. Here, any skill resembles an absence, or a kind of 
stillness, rather than a positive technique. 
I return to lived experience with groups of young children aware that they 
too--as deeply vulnerable as they are to the chaos, the discord, the absence of 
meaning which threaten their life together--are caught up in a conversation t hat 
speaks to them, although it in no way enslaves them. I mean that their conver-
sations are, as discourse, narrative, and essence, as deeply meaningful as any 
adult's, when looked at phenomenologically; perhaps more meaningful, because 
young children are paradigmatically naked of either subterfuge or technique, and 
so the real themes emerge, and it is possible to see the "logic of question and 































The earth is just a ball. 
Just a ball. 
Yah, but not a bouncing ball. 
Not a bouncing ball. 
Just a hard kind of rock ball. 
Yah. 
Or a basketball. [laughs} 
[Nathan starts making loud bounaing noises} 
A basketball player couldn't throw the earth. 
A basketball player couldn't throw the earth? But when you say "just a 
ball," I'm not sure what the "just" means. 
Well .. 
It's not just a ball. 
[joking} It's just a basketball. 
Well let's let Penny explain, O.K.? 
It's sort of like a ball. 
It's not completely round, but it's almost round. 
Yah. 
O.K. 
It's not a square or triangle. 
[Brad is giggling and joking about the "earth as basketball" notion to 
Peter, who is sitting next to him} 
But I'm particularly interested, Brad--
It is a triangle! 
No it's not it's a rect--it's a circle! Silly! 
Or a sphere. 
But I'm ... I'm thinking of a force field. 
A force field? 
Yah, you know--
Gravity is around the earth. 
And you know, a space ship goes through a force field. 













































Yah l See, if gravity is here ... 
Yah, on the earth. 
It would go in space. 
Oh. Because the earth is in space? 
Yah. 
Yah. 
If it comes down here it would just start to float and go up to the 
earth. 
I would think of float I wonder what it feels like floatin'. 
Feels like a ghost. 
It must be pretty neat, huh? 
[over other voices ] Yah 'cause then you can push yourself down, and then 
when you hit the floor then you go whoop! like a bouncing ball. 
I wish I could fly like a bird. 
'Cause in space you don't have any gravity, and, um, in your space ship, 
and you go whoooop! Start to float up. 
And if you did have gravity you'd just stay on the ground, and some 
people, Pat told us, in this book, people they wanted to take a trip to 
the sun, but it would take, guess how many years? 
Two hundred. 
Four hundred. 




And it would take two Christmases ... 
Oh, wow ! 
And it would take until the next winter and the next spring and the next 
summer and the next fall. 
Uh huh. 
And it--
Uh uh ! The next Christmas. 
Yah. Two-- two Christmases. 
No. Only one Christmas. 
O.K. 
One . One Christmas. 
Anna, did you want to say something, or ... O.K .... Now, Sara had 
a very important question, but before she says it, if she remembers it 
I do. 
O.K. Before she says it, my very important question is, what ... I 
have two very important questions, as usual ... One question is, what, 
where does this thing [indicates globe] , this "just a ball" floating in 
space with gravity, with water on it, with plant life, with human life, 
with animal life ... where does this thing come from? 
From ... earth. 
Earth comes from earth? 
[chorus o f "No!" and "From God!" ] 
What comes from earth? 
The ball. 
Hey, who made God? 
Earth comes from God? 







































[three people talking at once about God and earth} 
What's wrong with you people? 
Something's wrong with you, Sara. 
[general silliness} 
Let's talk one at a time .... Anna? 
The world was being just a snowball, and then God •.. then God or 
Jesus made colors and turned it into a world. 
It was just a snowball .... You mean cold? 
Yahl 
A dirty snowball! [joke} 
It was a cold--
Dirty snowball. 
--dirty pack of something? 
[general tittering} 
[laughing} Cold! Snowball! 
Brad? Brad! Don't go past that, O.K.? ... Brad! We are having a 
discussion. It's not a joke session .... Brad! 
[D.K. does not perceive Brad as responding to his 1,xwning. Meanwhile, 
Anna is explaining, "It z.x:zs made like that." J 
Oh! David! Were the dinosaurs--
fin a lower voice, to Brad} Time out. 
The dinosaurs were--
/to Brad} Time out. 
[to Brad} Time out. 
David! Hey, were the dinosaurs born from that •.• Then it froze. 
Can I come back when you're done? 
[D.K. nods assent} 
Then it froze up. The ball froze up, when the dinosaurs. 
When they were born? Why do you say that? 
Um ... because ... because people say--
That's not true that they said . in the comet ... they said that 
the comet was the one who killed the dinosaurs ... you're telling a 
wrong thing. 
Na-uh! 
[with pronounced disdain} Well, if the comet was a dirty snowball, so 
a dirty snowball hit a dinosaur? 
[after a slight pause} My Mom and Dad might can see it, and I can't. 
O.K. Let's let Nathan finish his thought here. 
They say, um, the snowball ... um ... the dinosaurs froze •.. on 
the ... this earth. 
O.K. So--
[with sarcasm} Earth. This earth. 
The world. 
So you're making a connection between this frozen thing that Anna said, 
about the snowball . the frozen thing and the end of the dinosaurs 
... the death of the dinosaurs. 
Yah. That killed the .... It killed 'em. It killed 'em. 
[three or four struggling to get the floor} 
O.K. But let's let Peter speak to that, or to something. 
Um, when the dinosaurs were born, the comet did not come just then. 
I know, and--
They lived for a lot of years and then the ... whatever it's called 
come by. 

















































{a shouting match of "yes" and "no." Mostly "no."] 
{loudly] Only cavemen! 
Eg--the Egypts! 
The Egypts were around during dinosaur time? 
No no! That's all wrong! 
No it's not! 
Yes it is! There was lava back then! 
Cavemen! 
The Indians came! 
No! 
The Indians came after. 
The Indians came after the dinosaurs. 
Yah. 
And then the people came. 
You mean the Egypts. 
Yah the Egypts were the first people 
{drowning her out] Then the Indians, then the ... lifetime. 
Then the what? 
Lifetime. 
Dinosaurs. 
Cavemen, then Egypts were the first ones that were made. 
Oh, us you mean. 
Yah. Then came dinosaurs, then came, uh ... then came--
The dinosaurs, then the Egypts .. . 
Then came, uh ... then came .. . 
were first. We heard that on TV. 
... uh, Indians. Then ... then came people. 
Yah. 
Oh, you mean Indians aren't people? 
Yes they are! 
{ many shouted "yes!" J 
They're a different race of people. 
Yah. 
Races. Oh you mean there were different races? 




No we weren't! 
Yes we were! 
What--
No we weren't! 
Uh huh! 
Yes we were! 
I said we were Indians before. 
{a chorus of conflicting claims emerges: "Yes we were!" versus "No we 
weren't!" It becomes a rhythmic, antiphonal chant, four against four, 
steady but not shouting. Sara, who began it, is leading the stronger 
"No."] 
{shouting] You mean you're a hundred years old? 
Yes we was! 






I got it I got it! 
Uh, just dragonflies. 
Dragonflies? 
{uncertain [XJ.USe ] 
Thinking in Complexes 
The conversation is above all an event of collective language. In collec-
tive language events, structural and formal aspects tend to take priority over 
substantive and thematic ones. The patterning is aesthetic, concrete, and 
complexive, rather than abstract and superordinative. 
Furthermore, there is a kind of discourse, a narrative domain which defines 
the t opos of the conversation for everyone involved--in this case, the "story of 
how things work . " One wonders, it is true, whether this particular narrative 
structure would have survived long without my strategic restatements. But once 
in place, the "how things work" discourse calls forth characteristic responses, 
and calls on certain kinds of sources of, and authorities for, information. 
Meanwhile , the event moves through a dizzying series of associations, bumped from 
theme to theme by the evocation of images between the interlocutors, as well as 
the mutua l "calling up" of complexive pools of information. 
At the beginning, Anna--who tends to be in control of her sources--quickly 
summarizes "alive" notions: "Living. Alive. Moving." Alan, always the 
visionary dreamer, immediately flashes to the "alive" consciousness of the 
animator, and sees the earth as a cartoon character, with "rocket shoes ... two 
eyes and a smile." Nathan associates to a "hairy monster," a notion he doesn't 
have a chance to develop because his arch-rival (for this conversation anyway), 
Sara, moves on to the sun's relationship to the earth. 
Sara does this, I think, because she knows that the sun has something to do 
with keeping the earth "alive . " I try to connect it with the origins theme, but 
Nathan jumps to the origins/composition of the sun: "Burni ng gas." Then the 
confusion about the meaning of "gas" (gasoline) leads to near-insuperable diffi-
culties, which are almost cleared up by Peter, when Penny (who, as shown later , 
has a relatively low tolerance for ambiguity) breaks again with, "The earth is 
just a ball." She seems to be telling the boys: it's not a cartoon character, 
burning gasoline, or anything else. It's just what the globe shows it to be. 
It's just a ball. 
Then, there is the complexive chain: ball--snowball--dirty snowball--
Halley's Comet (then much in the news)--the theory of the extinction of the 
dinosaurs by cold--cavemen--Indians--Egyptians--dragonflies. That is, the tail 
of Halley's Comet was then being referred to as a dirty snowball, and the comEit 
was associated with ancient, ageless phenomena, and therefore origins, because 
it only comes around every so many years, more than a lifetime . Dinosaurs are 
associated with the origins of the earth, and their demise with cold snow, and 
they also were around a long time ago, as were the "Egypts," the cavemen, and the 
Indians. 
We have moved quickly and effortlessly from a "how things work" narrative 
to one of its subsets- - "how and in what order things came to be." That, anyway, 
is what the teacher seems to be after. And there are elements which go with that 
narrative. They emerge effortlessly, but wi thout explicit superordinative 
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organizers (though the unconscious presence of the latter is implied) like the 
found pieces of a broken-up puzzle. Being isolated but somehow connected, they 
are stated both absolutely, in that there is an intuitive certainty that each one 
fits somewhere in this narrative; and provisionally, in that their place in the 
story must be negotiated through the collective language event. Adults call it 
"brainstorming," or "creative thinking," but it is just how five-year-olds talk 
and think. 
It is, as termed in Vygotsky's penetrating description of young children's 
thought, a thinking in "complexes" rather than "concepts." He says: "While a 
concept groups according to one attribute, the bonds relating the elements of a 
complex may be as diverse as the contacts and relationships of the elements are 
in reality" (1962, p. 62). But in fact there i s a unifying attribute, which is 
"story," in this case the story of the True Account of the Origins, Causes, and 
Development of All Things, which is the story that science and certain kinds of 
philosophy (the kind, indeed, that led to science) is always telling. It is 
within this particular narrative trope that the complexes emerge. 
Simultaneity 
In the collective language event, everything happens at once. Language is 
linear and sequential only when it is stopped in the (adult) rituals of self-
control, of which printed language is the final exemplar. The event here under 
discussion, for example, was not fully recorded or transcribed. In order to have 
done so, a state-of-the-art voice microphone would have had to be attached to 
each child, and the constant interruptions and cases of more than one person 
talking at once somehow translated into print. Even then the text could never 
more than hint at the event's lived quality--especially the vivid, crucial 
presence of what Ricoeur (1976) calls "mimicry and gesture. 11 1 
The direction of all our conversation, its telos, is this simultaneity 
experienced as communion. "To reach an understanding with one's partner in a 
dialogue is not merely a matter of total self-expression and the successful 
assertion of one's point of view, but a transformation into a communion, in 
which we do not remain what we were" (Gadamer, 1975, p. 341). Language guides 
sequentially and linearly on one level--question/answer/assertion/negation/ 
question, and so forth. On the other hand, young children talking show how we 
cannot possibly contain or arrange discursively the wealth of association, 
sudden insight, and total affirmation or rejection that is experienced moment ous ly 
--as a shared moment--in conversation. The collective language event carries us 
out of ourselves, "we do not remain what we were," and in it our thought is 
happening together at once, as it is both created by the interplay of our lan-
guage, and creates that language from its own deep sources. 
In this, language and thought are simply seeking their common ontological 
ground. But the movement of events is dialectical, while the lived experience 
is synchronistic and simultaneous. This tension of the one and the many embodied 
in the collective language event can become almost unbearable. The event in its 
historical and propositional significance emerges in time: certain developments 
lead to other developments which could not have been predicted, and cast meaning 
back on the original developments. This is the dialectic. But within this 
linear, temporal perspective we are also "one body," members of a cosmos that 
speaks, and the sense of atemporal communion which this occasions eventually 
breaks into play, which is its ritualization. Only ritual--the antiphonal chorus, 
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for example, of page 20--can express such intensity of atmosphere. Then language 
takes over altogether, in Dionysian s i multaneity. 
If it were not for the adult, the passage into ritual play would here have 
probably been followed by the dissolution of the language event. D.K. steers 
out of it on page 17 ("It's just a basketball"), and later actually flatly 
banishes a member for a time.2 Otherwise, things would likely have peaked in 
humor, then fallen apart, perhaps to regroup, perhaps to shift altogether--in a 
rush for the play-yard, for example. This poses questions about the inherent 
tensions of the pedagogical relationship. Without the grouchy, repetitive, limit-
ing, demanding adult, the conversation would never last. Yet in seeking the 
point where it explodes in hilarity, the conversation is only seeking to express 
its lived ground, which is the event of communion--of wordplay, of laughter, 
song, dance, wrestling (lovemaking). 
Dammed off as it is from its ground, the conversation becomes theatre. 
Sara (the dominator) and Nathan (the i nnovator) struggle for power, while 
authority that comes with having some command of the scientific knowledge base 
is established in Peter, and Anna balances accounts judiciously and thoughtfully. 
Penny's passionate convict i ons, her intense desire for closure, will eventually 
carry her to the point of self-contradiction. Alan dreams whimsically, while 
Joana's emerges as a gnomic, poet/seer's voice. Each of these personal giftings 
is cast dramatically as a mythic role, thus transforming discourse into drama. 
In drama, the participants are caught up in a significance of which they are a 
part, yet which transcends them- - which speaks through them, even as they struggle 























O.K., Sara, what then was before the dinosaurs? And what even before 
then? I mean what about •.• thi s thing? 
[indiaates globe in middle of airale] 
No one knows. 
No one knows? 
Yah--
I know I know I know! 
You know? 
I'm the bookworm. 
You're the bookworm, so you know? [Sara nods, but says nothing] O.K. 
Anna? 
Ahhh! You're not the bookworm! 
Well . 
You don't have every book in the whole wide world. 
Well, I at least have one of ... the [inaudibl e ] . Um--
Then you have to have every one of them. 
Why don't you let Anna say, and then you think of what you're going to 
say. O.K., Anna. 
When the dinosaurs were alive, Egypts and cavemen--
Cavemen was after. Cavemen. 
... and Indians were alive. And--
I think cavemen--
--and dinosaurs killed some of the Egypts. Heard that on the news. 
You heard that on the news? [over interrupti ons] Well then what came 
... what was before the dinosaurs? 
I know! 

































I got it I got it I got it I got it! 
Before the Indians? 
I don't know I don't know. 
You don't know? O.K. Do you think it's known? 
I do! 
Do you think people know? Does somebody know? 
I do! I do! 
It's in a book. 
The oldest person--
I know. 
It was dinosaurs. 
--who was about to die knows. 
Was about to ... 
Die, is about to die. Because he was the oldest one. I think that's 
true: the oldest. 
I see. O.K. Sara, she says that the oldest person would know the 
ans--Peter , I think, is saying [turning to Peter}. Did you say 
that somebody knew too? 
Yah. [indicating a book in his hand} 
That it's in a book? 
[shouting} It's God! God's know e-- God--
This book. Here's a book for you. 
There's a book called Giant Dinosaurs. So can this book tell us what 
was before dinosaurs? 
[a chorus o f "Yahl"} 
But Anna says that the oldest person in the world knows the answer to 
the origins of the earth! 
I know one answer I know it! 
Of life! 
I do know it! I have this book called Danny and t he Dinosaur and it 
told me that, well, dinosaurs couldn't come alive. The people, they 
found bones, and they found their skin with the bones, and they put the 
bones together, and put skin on them, and I didn't really believe that, 
but anyway, it wasn't true, it was just a story, well, it might have 
been real, I don't know. But anyway, Danny, he went--the dinosaur was 
real, and he played like he had one outside but he really didn't have 
one, but he pretended like the dinosaur came alive, but dinosaurs can't 
do that when they're a hundred years old. 
!fi ve full seconds of silence} 
f i n a l ow voice } I don't believe this. 
Why not, Penny? 
When do we get to go outside? 
Why don't you believe this? 
I'm gettin' tired of this. 
'Cause I don't believe anything, about if that's true. 
God--God just knows everything. 
Playfulness 
If there is any one overriding paradigm for the "universality of the lived 
event," it is play. We become players when we give ourselves to the play of the 
presencing which is the event in its unfolding. The textualization of the lived 
event helps us to see the larger patterns at play in it--although we can never 
see them except in frozen sections, like stopped action in a photograph, which 
evokes movement yet is still. 
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Play is the universal quality of event in two ways: both the activity of 
the "playing out" of roles and narrative patterns that always transcend the 
participants, a being caught up in the fateful play of the world which the event 
is; and the particular re-presentation--the "play" in the sense of the dramatic 
narrative as a whole--which the playing out accomplishes. The young child is a 
sort of unconscious master of both these aspects of the lived event. 
In this text, the child's play is, both because of its subject matter and 
because of its mediation by an adult (i.e., its pedagogical nature), primarily 
agon , or contest. Play as contest is intrinsically bound up with festival/rit e 
(Huizinga, 1955, pp. 30-31), of which the collective language event is one form. 
The text shows each child being transformed, in the passionate, precipitous 
intensity of the event, into an element of meaning in a larger, complex, multiple 
relation. We sense destiny in the playing out of each role. We know that Sara 's 
overpowering drive for performance and attention will mark her whole life, 
whether in its present, naked form, or transformed into a form of wisdom by 
experience. The event "plays" Sara like an instrument: in her rivalry with 
Nathan, in her passionate determination to beat what she perceives as the 
teacher's game ("I know I know I know I know!"), Sara is expressed by the event. 
She is carried out of herself, and in the play of festival/contest, becomes both 
what is particularly meaningful about herself--her very essential, unique, 
concrete personality--and a universal human type, one part-of-speech in the 
involuntary grammatical patterning of the lived event. 
What is true for each individual participant in the agon is true for the 
event as a whole: in all the concrete particularity of the to and fro motion of 
the interplay of the players, a universal story emerges, of which the event is a 
dramatization. Each participant is caught up in the story which is telling 
itself, as, for example, the great tragedies tell themselves. And what is 
telling itself here is a story about a crisis in belief systems. The text may 
be read as the script of a play about world view, about authoritative knowledge 
(what one can know, and how), about ideological conflict within a culture, about 
God and Satan. 
The young child's enactment of this script reveals the playfulness of exis-
tence itself. Plato's dialogues--the paradigmatic models of philosophical 
discourse--reveal this as well, but not with the raw immediacy of young children, 
for whom to live is to play, and whose very artlessness allows the essentiality 
of the playful to be glimpsed before its appropriation by tradition, world view, 
or sheer technique. 
Emergence 
What gives the play its peculiar urgency is an essential relation between 
speech and thought. The festival event of collective language is a poetic event, 
in the Ricouerian sense that it is an event of "being becoming aware of itself" 
through the emergence of "the enigma of novel meaning beyond the bounds of previ-
ously established rules" (Ricoeur, 1977, p. 302). Nathan is stunned by his own 
brainstorms; they emerge from a dimension of his understanding over which he has 
little control. Nathan discovers himself saying things. 
"Thought tends towards expression as towards its completion" (Merleau-Ponty, 
1962, p. 177). And in the collective language event, expression calls out 
expression. The emergent meaning is always a greater meaning, a whole whose 
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parts can be what they are only in relationship to all the other parts. The 
many thinkers are operating involuntarily as one thinker expressing itself. In 
the dialectic to which the speakers have given themselves, one thing is saying 
itself through the participation of each. This one thing is what Ricoeur calls 
"the truth of meaning . " "Being," he says, "feels itself a spontaneous and 
inexhaustible source of transcendence towards the truth of meaning through the 
workings of expression" (1978, p. 253). 
The truth of meaning is not a statement or series of statements which 
correspond to sense-reality, or any set of logical entailments. The truth of 
meaning is dynamic and emergent, a polysernous order in which a surplus of signifi-
cance haunts thought. The order of meaning siezes these young children, and they 
are cast as dramatic actors in the play which is its self-representation. 
Part of the drarna--in fact what gives it its particular poignancy, and 
characterizes it as hurnan--is the sense of danger, of anxiety at the possibility 
of untruth which the dialectic of indivi dual and collective, finite and non-
finite, evokes. The participants are always, in fear and compelling desire, 
missing the mark: trying to make finite, personal, and certain the truth of 
meaning by having it before it emerges, or having it all to themselves, or 
cutting off further emergence . They are beset by the basic anxiety of beings 
who know transcendence yet are in time. But the order of meaning is present 
only in what Merleau-Ponty called the paro le parlant which, "like a wave, gathers 
and poises itself to hurtle beyond its own limits" (1962, p. 197); which is never 
complete, is always corning into being, is always evoking a totality which flees 

























God--God just knows everything. 
Yah, yah, God knows when the earth comes ... God made the earth. 
knows everything .•. [i naudib l e ] 
[soorn ful ly ] Hey! 




But the earth was there before. 
He made it! 
What were the dinosaurs on if there wasn't the earth? 
[a olamor of shouted oorronents] 
Let's let Peter talk. 
There wasn't earth, what was the dinosaurs on? 
He 
He knows when the dinosaurs came and when the dinosaurs died, and when 
the Egypts came and when the cave men came . • . and the Indians. 
The ... cave men came before the Indians. 
He knows when all that came. 
Who? 
How do you know? 
God. 
God? Is that what you're saying? 
Then why do we know their names? 
Well if Jesus was born on the earth, how could he make the earth if he 
was born on it? 
But, how did we know his name? 






























Yah, his name and God's name. Why we--how did we know thei r names? 
'Cause God told us. 
'Cause God told us. 
Oh, that's what--but did we see God? Noooo! 
[ chorus o f "no " J 
I seen God. 
We've never seen God. 
Where did you see him? 
My mother told me--
A church. 
A church. 
And I believe him. 
And you believe him. 
Yes. 
I don't believe in a God. 
[general aff irmations or denia ls of be l ie f ] 
No, I do not believe in him . 
I said every prayer last night and I couldn't. 
And I talk to God and he talks to me. 
[to Sara } Why? 
I don't know ...• 'Cause my dog is dead and I like him. It was a her 
and her name was Hobbit, and she looked so much like Toto. 
[picking up on Peter 's f lung comment} And Peter says he doesn't believe 
in God and it's only a story? 
Yah, it's only a ... it's only a fake! 
It's only a story about God making the earth. It's not true. 
Uh uh uh ! 
God did make the earth. 
[genera l controversy] 
Yahl It's only a fake! 
And he says that the earth has been here forever, but--
It is not a fake! 
He made it! 
[more controversy : "I s this earth i nvi s ible ?" . • . "You don' t be lieve 
it " ... "No, it 's not " ... "Us would be fa l ling i n space" . 
Eta .] 
The discussion takes its own course. On one reading, it is like a powerful, 
unbroken horse, whose rider (D.K.?) uses every technique he knows to keep it "on 
track." It is almost undoubtedly true that it never would have taken place 
without the adult, or at least would not have lasted for more than a few minuteis. 
The young child is "young" in just that sense of powerlessness before the task 
of what Smith refers to as the "dialectic" of"· .. the inner tension in human 
existence between order and disorder, the rational and the bestial. Our task is 
to maintain unity of self, integrity, within every threatening disintegration 
into boundless chaos" (Gadamer, 1986, p. 122, translator's footnote). To hand l e 
this dialectic requires the ancient virtues of phronesis (reasonableness) and 
andrei a (courage), neither of which are childlike virtues. On this reading, 
dialogue is always won from the excesses and distortions of fear and desire, 
which cast their grotesque projections into the language event like the images 
in a distorting mirror. 
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On another, not necessarily incompatible reading, the discussion "takes its 
own course," not towards chaos and entropy, but as the unfolding of an inherent 
reason in existence, through the "logic of question and answer." This is another 
sort of dialectic, a self-unfolding re-presentation (a "play") of existence in 
i ts truth, through the playfulness of dialogue. Gadamer calls this "philosophi-
cal dialectic," which, he says, "presents the whole of truth, in the self-
cancellation of all partial propositions by bringing contradictions to a head and 
overcoming them" (1975, p. 429). For this dialectic, the immanent, gui ding telos 
is the "exigence of reason for unity" (1982, p. 19), an inexorable movement of 
existence towards the revelation of a totality of meaning.3 Philosophical 
dialectic functions, "not as a methodic activity of the subject, but as something 
whi ch the thing i tself does, and which thought 'suffers.'" In the lived language 
event, "this act i vity of the thing itself is the real speculative movement that 
takes hold of the speaker" (Gadamer, 1975, p. 431). 
What is revealing about being present with young children at this event of 
"suffering" the emergence of meaning is the dramatic clarity of its unfolding. 
Here, the awesome skill of Socrates cannot fool us into taking the dialectic of 
dialogue as merely a product of technique. Here we find it, so to speak, in 
nature. Gadamer describes its logical structure as simultaneous synopsis (seeing 
things together as one) and dihaire sis (division, or differentiation) (1986, 
p. 19). Nathan, for example, even in the very midst of a joke rapidly mushroom-
ing in Brad's hands (p. 19), followed by a disciplinary incident, fields a 
synopsis : the connections between snow and dinosaurs and origins hit him with 
everything, from nowhere, in no order. Then di hairesis begins--between the 
comet and dinosaurs, between humans and dinosaurs, between different eras of 
humanity. The dihairesis of this section then requires further synopsis --a 
pulling of "cavemen," "Egypts," "Indians," and "people" together in their vari ous 
relationships, and putting them all on a grand time line. 
There are two really striking things about this process. One is how its 
dynamic structure proceeds so smoothly through the agon of continuing contradic-
tion, restatement, affirmation, and contradiction. Another, which is made even 
more dramatic by the fact that these children don't have a great deal of infor-
mation to work with, is how this is a process, not only of the emergent 
self-clarification of the subject matter, but of collective negotiation of the 
proaess itsel f by the participants. 
Nathan (the innovator) has tacit knowledge that his brainstorming is partial 
and provisional, in need of dihaires is , requiring others in order to emerge and 
be clarified. This makes him willing to ride out conflict, to negotiate his 
insights with others . Negotiation is how these children preside over, or assist 
at, the emergence of the subject matter through the logic of question and answer. 
Negotiation is the fundamental modality of language as a mediative structure, 
as conversati on. 
Negotiation is the heart of dialogue, in that it is a way of being mai euti-
cally i n the language event, of allowing one's particular perspective to be 
transformed by the dialectic of dialogue. I.n the "communion in which we do not 
remain what we were," the order of meaning emerges in concrete, contingent 
situation through negotiation. But this is not to say either that truth is a 
negotiated, collective construct, or that negotiation is a sort of therapeutic 
ideal; that, for example, the "self-actualized" person has attained to "negotia-
tion," and could bring the order of meaning into every contingency ( if only 
everyone else were also an adept). 
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On the contrary, negotiation can be dangerous. Our text can also be read 
as a story of dialogue breaking down. Nor is such ambiguity abnormal to the 
dialectic of dialogue. Socrates often drives his interlocutors away, and many 
of his dialogues end with a pervasive sense of aporia, of puzzlement. In this 
text, we see fear and desire almost systematically distorting the communicative 
process, and threatening dialogue. This is especially clear in Sara, who is so 
compulsively determined to "achieve" at what she understands as a teacher-led 
game (which in fact it is, but not of the kind she has already, at age five, 
come to expect) that she sows rivalry, discord, and unpleasant absurdity through 
the event. Her presence is felt and read as anti-dialogical, in that she tends 
to direct her dynamic energies, not towards the emergent, negotiated truth of 
the matter, but towards self--personal performance, recognition, and control--
which interferes with her ability to think or react with much clarity or order. 
But Sara is not the villain of this piece. The qualities that she shows 
forth as if larger than life, everyone shares. Her struggle with the "inner 
tension between order and disorder, the rational and the bestial" is simply more 
dramatically offset, as if projected onto a larger screen. For all anyone 
knows, she is fated to learn to deal with that tension more effectively than the 
others. Rather, the sense of breakdown reflects both the ideological diversity 
of the participants' families--the tension between the deep-cultural assumptional 
sets that each child already carries--and the perilous nature of the dialogical 
itself. The stakes are always high if the dialogue is real, for fear and desire 
construe the "suffering" of dialogue as a form of self-loss. Letting "the 
activity of the thing itself" "take hold" of one promises a kind of death. A 
"communion in which we do not remain what we were" is a frightening spectre to 
the self-protective ego. But as Sara's role in the text implies, the principle 
of self-aggrandizement is not compatible with the principle of unity of self, 
of integrity; rather, it calls forth "disintegration into boundless chaos," th€i 
war of the all against the all, which includes the self's perverse and subtle 
war against itself. 
Dialogue is not always easy, natural, or therapeutic. The dialectic of 
dialogue, where things speak themselves, is won through "holding to one definite 
thing within threatening indeterminacy." This movement is, on Gadamer's account, 
the dialectic of human life itself, which "at every moment is itself and, 
exactly for that reason, separated from itself" (Gadamer, 1986, p. 122). But 











David! David! They say if you don't believe in God you go to the uh 
. • • Devil. 
[after a sli ght -pa.use} Devi l not real. 
Devil's not true, Sara! 
Yahl 
Yes it is. If the Devil--
No it's not, man! 
Yahl If the Devil was true, what'd the earth be? Nothing but a smoking 
crater! 
If you lied one time you would go down. And I lied one time, and I 
didn't go down .... I had a been dead by now. I would be dead by 
now. 
[aontroversy and aonfusion of voiaes is s t eadily growing i n int ensity} 
It is a real Devil. It is not fake! 















































It is not. 
Yes it is, Sara! 
No it's not! 
It's real. 
It is too, it's fake. 
No it's not, you're just trying to go down to the Devil. 
No I'm not! It's only fake. 
Scott [her older brother] has one at his .. at his school sometimes. 
Fake! Hey Devil! I know what you got. I no got a voice ..• I no 
got a voice •.• 
He is real. 
There is the devil, I know that. 
I seen the Devil in a Bible, and on Sunday •.. [drowned out] 
I no got a voice Devil, so kill me! Kill me! 
It says in the .• um ... in the Bible that there is a real Devil. 
Uh uh! 
There is not! It's only a fake! 
I saw a real devil in my Bible! 
It's not real. 
It's only a fake. 
I saw the Devil. 
Huh? You saw him, you say? 
Yah, a real big one. 
If the Bible says there's a 
. Jesus wrote that. 
Ah. So if the Bible •.• 
No! There's only a fake. 
It is not! 
Devil in it then ... there are 'cause 
You're taking the word of the Bible. 
It's only a fake. 
[more shouting lxiak and forth] 
The Holy Bible has a ..• reading of the Devil, and Jesus wrote that. 
Oh. The Holy Bible--
Still fake! 
So you're saying that if it's in the Bible then it's true. 
In my Bible I saw what the Devil really looks like, I did. 
How was that? 
What did he look like? 
He was all red, he had blood all over him, he had horns, he had hooves 
•.• he just looked so gross! 
Was it a photograph, or a painting, or--
It was a photograph. Somebody that saw him. But you know what? In 
that Bible it told me that the Devil is real. And he can come for you 
when you're dead, and get you when you never believe in God .•• Or God 
will drive you down. 
I believe in God. 
I don't! ... I don't believe in God. 
Joana? 
I believe in God! 
Everyone believes in God. 
I don't believe it. There's no such thing as God! 
[four people are talking at onae . Penny is still insisting passionately, 
"It's just a fake." Alan starts making mooing noises. J 
David, can we go outside? My stomach is getting runny. 
Yes. We'll just have a couple minutes, but--






Hey David, David ! I saw this kind of devil. And this devil was sittin' 
on a court thing, and he didn't . . . he just had hands •.. and dogs 
. devil dogs •.. and then he said ..• and then he pushed that 
. that man, you know that was standing beside him, into the devil 
dog and they ate, and they bited him he go "Yow!" and he just went out . 
Oh. Was this on a cartoon? 
Yah. 
Oh. 
[now leaving to go outs ide, making little screams, like the cartoon man 
who l.<Xls bitten] Yow! Yow ! Yow! Yow! 
Replication 
I have already pointed out that the text can be read as a drama of contem-
porary life. Young children are putt i ng on a play about the adult world--with 
the help, of course, of an adult, who provides key elements of the script. But 
what are the key elements of the plot as a whole? 
There is, for one, an argument goi ng on about knowledge. How can one know 
the true story? What are the authorities ? Anna claims TV, the wisdom of 
extreme old age, and her mother; Sara and Peter, many books; Brad, Penny (at 
first), and Joana, revelation; Maisy, local custom and her brother; and Nathan, 
empirical testing. Alan, the bemused dreamer, never claims anything. In the 
final encounter, the implicit dissonance between these various author ities is 
compressed into a searing confrontation between revelation/belief and empiricism/ 
common sense, which divides the group almost equally in half. 
The argument about knowledge is really an argument about belief, or first 
principles. These young children are replicating, not just the atmosphere, but 
the fundamental content of the ideological conflict (often identified by the 
euphemistic term "pluralism") which is a prominent feature of late twentieth 
century American cultural experience. The dramatic about-face of Penny exempli-
fies the ambivalence of a culture which has moved from a confessing Christian to 
a radically naturalistic metaphysic within a short one hundred years. 
There seems to be a complicated social process going on, in which the 
relative authority that each person carries in the group is delicately weighed 
in the negotiation, before sides are finally taken, and an impasse reached. 
Nathan, for example, first raises the question of God, in usual brainstorming 
fashion (p. 24), but is ignored. He raises it again--"God--God just knows 
everything" (p. 26)--after Sara's demoralizing monologue. Then, in that tired 
silence, it is heard, upon which things heat up and maintain at fever pitch 
until the end. 
Penny first affirms Nathan's introduction of God (p. 26). Then Peter, a 
six-year-old who is generally recognized as having a closer-to-adult version of 
things, protests ("Hey!", p. 26), and raises a logical problem about the deity 
of Jesus. Penny persists, but then Nathan raises another, even deeper question 
--the question of how we know the story about God at all. He seems to be 
responding to his own earlier statement, which started the whole thing. At thi s 
Penny switches, and from here on presents a united front with Nathan and Peter, 
and, when they back down some (p. 27), against them as well. In the course of 
things, she has moved from arguing that "He knows everything" (p. 26), to "I 
don't believe in a God" (p. 27), to "It's only a fake!" (pp. 27, 29-30), with 
increasing passion. 
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What is being replicated here is a climate of belief in which philosophical 
scept i cism has final authority. Religious belief is treated as a falsifiable 
hypothesis--that is, as a proposition that can be treated like any other scien-
tifi c hypothesis. This, as Whittaker (1981), in an analysis of this very 
phenomenon, says, "makes affirmations of religious faith look like guesswork . " 
He goes on: 
Philosophiaal saepti ai sm does not deri ve i t s fo rae from any par tiaular 
reason for doubt; it draws its strengt h f rom the general possibilities 
o f error and the abs traat possibi l ity of findi ng new reasons for doubt-
ing old truths . How aan we be abso l ut ely sure of what we know as long 
as suah possibi l ities exi s t ? That i s t he probl em. (p. 12) 
This is Peter's and Nathan's game. 
On a deeper level, what is being replicated is a confusion between two 
different language fames, or two different orders of truth claims--the religious 
and the scientific. For the naturalistic metaphysics of science, every event 
has a cause; therefore, any first cause must be within nature. But a first 
cause within nature is unthinkable. For religious thought this is not really 
even an issue, for the quest i on of God belongs outside the "logical space" of 
contingency. Its prime premise is completely anti-naturalistic. "God does not 
belong to the class of existing things: not that He has no existence, but that 
He is above all existing things, nay even above existence itself" (Losky, 1957, 
p. 36). 5 
Religi ous principles assume the non-contingency, the meaningful purpose and 
order, and the intelligibility of the universe as foundational. These assump-
tions are what Wittgenstein (1972) called "certainties." When certainties are 
reassessed as hypotheses, the whole structure of tacit judgments which grounds 
them is weakened. Anomalies in the "ideal of explicability" proliferate. 
Finally, a new ideal of explicability moves into place, by which the old ideal 
is held up to scrutiny (Whittaker, 1981). 
This story--the story of a crisis in the Western ideal of explicability--is 
what the text is tel ling. It is what the children are playing. What is extra-
ordinary is the degree to which they have internalized its basic plot. Beyond 
that, they do not carry the story further (although they may yet--it depends to 
some extent on pedagogy), but ritualize it with unerring dramatic sense. In 
the hands of their unconscious mastery, it takes on the haunting, antiphonal 
automaticity of ancient theatre, with its fatal instinct for the truth. 
Conclusions 
I must repeat that this text could be read differently: as a failed exer-
cise in communicative competence, for example, or as a struggle between teacher 
and students; as a sociological printout, or a printout of cognitive stage; as 
an example of i deological formation, or an exercise in singing the world through 
the precise rhythm-play of pitch and juncture; and so forth. Different inter-
pretive approaches call forth different essences. This must be so, for the 
essences are eminently temporal and relational, and only come to light through 
interpretation. 
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The essences, however, are no less universal for all that. The point is 
that whenever we touch the concrete immediate in its integrity there is a revela-
tion of the essential. It is the abstract--ta mathemata (Heidegger, 1977a, 
pp. 267-269)--which opposes itself to the concrete, not the universal or essen-
tial. This is what precludes any technique or technology of the reading of 
essences which would attempt to reduce the interpretive function to an equation 
based on statistical probability. It also precludes the sort of systematic 
ideological agenda, equally abstract, which grounds interpretation on a dramati-
cally oversimplified semantical universe like "critical-rational-hegemony-
domination-emancipation-resistance." Rather, each reading carries the peculiar 
concrete way of living the universal of each interpreter, on a structural level 
beneath (if never entirely free of) "interest," and its reification in ideology 
or technique. The essences emerge when the interpreter is led by the activity 
of the thing itself. 
What surprises me about this reading is discovering how young children and 
adults, in spite of apparent differences, tend to approach fundamental things in 
the same way. If anything, young children show forth the fundamentals more 
clearly than adults, because they tend to "play" things--or, rather, allow 
themselves to be played, to be mastered by things, to be drawn into the collec-
tive language event in its spontaneous representat i on of the world.6 This would 
not surprise me, of course, if I were not prey to the "natural attitude," which 
interprets the apparent differences between adults and children as more radical 
than they essentially are, and no doubt carries analogous exaggerative distor-
tions of perspective when interpreting their similarities. 
The elements of attention and surprise that come with such momentary breaks 
in the natural attitude are essential to responsible pedagogy. This i s espe-
cially important because the pedagogue's role is to produce tension in children--
not a fruitless tension, but a tension that calls for and allows the response of 
noetic (and therefore psychic) enlargement, articulation, and synthesis. But a 
teacher who is continually in the natural attitude, and who never experiences a 
reversal of consciousness before the child, can foster a different kind of 
tension--one which is fruitless and negative, and which makes children hate 
school. Children can become a sort of natural enemy to adults who no longer 
look to them for that "moment of negativity" which is a moment of truth. This 
is not to say that pedagogues and children are not often in conflict; but their 
conflict should result in the "blessed wounds of a friend," and not bitter 
generational animosity. 
Looking for the break in the natural attitude is not peculiar to the adult-
child relationship. It is true of any relationship which is not turning bad or 
standing still. It is the ground-stance of dialogue. It takes, however, a 
unique form in the relationship between teacher and child, who face each other 
from radically different places in the life cycle, and operate in relatively 
distinct temporal, perceptual, and noetic modes. To call one merely more or 
less than, or on the way to, or a later form of the other, is to mask the lived 
experience of difference with mere explanations, however true in one sense they 
may be. It is this lived experience that this text has preserved, if in a 
ghostly fashion. It is lived experience that pedagogues need somehow to capture 
and reflect upon, if they are to grow in their practice. 
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Notes 
l 11 To the extent that in spoken discourse the illocutionary force depends 
upon mimicry and gesture, and upon the nonarticulated aspects of discourse, which 
we call prosody, it must be acknowledged that the illocutionary force is less 
inscribable than the propositional meaning. Finally, the perlocutionary act is 
the least inscribable aspect of discourse • . . " (Ricoeur, 1976, p. 27). 
2Note that Brad, whose silliness I thought was threatening the discussion, 
was back on p. 30 for the discussion about God. He had stuck his head in at the 
door, and I had motioned him to return. 
3rt is arguable that this drive for unity is present in a demonic form in 
war, whose inherent dialectic results in the totality of M.A.D. (Mutually 
Assured Destruction). 
4This is putting it mildly. The confusion can be--and increasingly is--
interpreted as the result of epistemological imperialism on science's part. For 
example: "The point of confrontation between science and religion is not any one 
theory. It is, rather, the extension of scientific metatheoretical assumptions 
to a point of dominion over all other metatheoretical assumptions about the 
world" (Stanley, 1978, p. 17). 
5Losky is quoting St. John Damascene. He also quotes St. Gregory Palamas: 
"For if God be nature then all else is not nature. If that which is not God be 
nature, God is not nature, and likewise He is not being if that which is not God 
is being" (p. 37). 
6Gadamer: "[Play's] mode of being is self-representation ... self-repre-
sentation is a universal aspect of the being of nature" (1975, p. 97). 
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